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Online diagnosis of accidental faults for
real-time embedded systems using a
hidden Markov model
Ning Ge1, Shin Nakajima2 and Marc Pantel1
Abstract
This article proposes an approach for the online analysis of accidental faults for real-time embedded systems using hid-
den Markov models (HMMs). By introducing reasonable and appropriate abstraction of complex systems, HMMs are
used to describe the healthy or faulty states of system’s hardware components. They are parametrized to statistically
simulate the real system’s behavior. As it is not easy to obtain rich accidental fault data from a system, the Baum–Welch
algorithm cannot be employed here to train the parameters in HMMs. Inspired by the principles of fault tree analysis and
the maximum entropy in Bayesian probability theory, we propose to compute the failure propagation distribution to esti-
mate the parameters in HMMs and to adapt the parameters using a backward algorithm. The parameterized HMMs are
then used to online diagnose accidental faults using a vote algorithm integrated with a low-pass filter. We design a specific
test bed to analyze the sensitivity, specificity, precision, accuracy and F1-score measures by generating a large amount of
test cases. The test results show that the proposed approach is robust, efficient and accurate.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
As the scale and complexity of real-time embedded sys-
tems are rapidly increasing due to the growth of functional
and non-functional requirements, resource-consuming
simulation technologies are not able to detect all faults in
systems design. Thus, the use of abstract models to simu-
late the behavior of complex systems preserving manda-
tory semantics is now a strong requirement. The efficiency
and accuracy of model-based approaches depend on the
appropriate abstraction and reasonable assumptions. This
article restricts the attention to the problem of online acci-
dental fault diagnosis for monitored real-time embedded
systems.
According to the terminology defined in the litera-
ture,1–3 the accidental faults that happen in hardware and
software are caused either by design faults, physical wear
and tear, environmental conditions or by a peculiar set of
inputs/excitations given to the system. They can be both
expected or unexpected faults. Although accidental faults
are usually very rare in the runtime, still it is mandatory to
detect and diagnose them in real-time embedded systems
to ensure that the fault tolerance infrastructure will
automatically maintain the functionality. This is currently
the main method for improving the reliability and depend-
ability of embedded systems.
The detection and isolation (diagnosis) of faults (FDI)
in engineering systems has been of great practical signifi-
cance since the 1990s.4 FDI is dedicated to monitoring a
system, identifying when a fault has occurred, and pin-
pointing the type of fault and its location. One main FDI
methodology derives faults from models, classified into
the category of model-based FDI, which relies on an expli-
cit mathematical or knowledge-based model of the con-
trolled system. Various model-based FDI approaches have
been widely used in process engineering and dynamic sys-
tems, such as observer-based, parity-space, parameter-
estimation methods, etc.5–7
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1.2. Previous works
The research topic in this work derives from the previous
work by Nakajima et al.,8 which proposed a co-analysis
framework for the automated analysis of cyber-physical
systems (CPS).9 As a kind of real-time embedded system
with feedback loops from the environment, CPS receive
more and more attention from researchers in recent years.
CPS introduce a new paradigm to software-intensive sys-
tems, in which the controller (system) is strongly affected
by the feedback from the plant (environment). In Nakajima
et al.,8 the behavior of Simulink models is taken in an as-is
manner determined by the simulation algorithms. The
approach combines logic-based formal analysis methods
with numerical simulations to enable the analysis of an
under-constrained controller design, which cannot be
handled by co-simulation. As shown in Figure 1, a control-
ler may have several control modes and evolve by enabling
mode transitions. Since some of the Simulink model
descriptions represent hardware components, the controller
is expected to be able to online diagnose the accidental
fault F (t) occurring in the hardware. Therefore, an open
question remaining in Nakajima et al.8 is the analysis of
possible accidental faults in Simulink models in order to
increase the level of robustness.
To describe accidental faults in Simulink models that
represent hardware components, it is required to define a
failure rate parameter for each component (usually very
low values). The Simulink models are then able to ran-
domly generate some faulty signals according to these
parameters. A modeling method is needed to simulate the
system’s behavior to observe the output data from the
plants and online determine whether the hardware compo-
nents encounter an accidental fault as well as which com-
ponent does.
1.3. Contributions
This article targets the accidental fault diagnosis problem
for real-time embedded systems by proposing a modeling
method based on hidden Markov models (HMMs).10–12. In
HMMs, the system being modeled is assumed to be a
Markov process with unobserved (hidden) states. By ana-
lyzing the observation sequences from the hidden states,
the state sequence can be deduced. HMMs have thus been
widely used in temporal pattern recognition such as
speech, handwriting, gesture recognition, etc.
This work introduces reasonable and appropriate
abstraction of complex systems relying on HMMs to
model the faulty and healthy states of system’s compo-
nents. They are parametrized to statistically simulate the
real system’s behavior. The challenge in this work consists
in limited accidental fault data, because it is not easy to
obtain rich accidental fault data from a system. It is not
reasonable to rely on the limited amount of faulty data to
adapt the parameters in the initial and transition matrices
using the Baum–Welch algorithm.13 We thus propose to
fix these two matrices using the failure rate parameters of
hardware components while estimate the emission prob-
abilities. The estimation method is based on the principles
of fault tree analysis (FTA) and the maximum entropy in
Bayesian probability theory. A fault propagation distribu-
tion is thus computed, whose parameters are adapted using
the backward algorithm and observations. The parameter-
ized HMMs are then used to online diagnose accidental
faults using a vote algorithm integrated with a low-pass
filter. We design a specific test bed to assess some core
measures for fault diagnosis approaches, including the sen-
sitivity, specificity precision, accuracy and F1-score. The
test results show that the approach is robust, efficient and
accurate.
1.4. Organization of article
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
HMM modeling methods; Section 3 compares this pro-
posal with the related works; Section 4 formulates the tar-
get problem; Section 5 details the accidental fault
diagnosis approach based on HMMs; Section 6 experi-
ments the approach by designing a specific test bed, and
discusses the generalization of the approach; Section 7
gives some concluding remarks.
2. HMMmodeling and analysis
An HMM is defined as a statistical model used to repre-
sent stochastic processes, where the states are not directly
observed. When modeling a system, HMM separates the
system into two conceptually independent paradigms:
behavior and observation. Behavior refers to what the sys-
tem really is; while observation to what the system exhi-
bits. The observations are used for the recognition of the
inner behavior. The initial state distribution p indicates
the probabilities for the initial state of the system. The
state transition matrix A controls the way the hidden state
at time t is chosen given the hidden state at time t 2 1.
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Figure 1. Accidental fault diagnosis in CPS.
The emission matrix B connects the behavior between
states and observations: if at a given time the behavior is
known, how probably an observation sequence will occur.
An HMM can be described as follows:
 N, number of states;
 M, number of observations;
 p, initial state probability distribution,
PN
i= 1
pi= 1;
 A, transition matrix {aij} for the probabilities from
state si to state sj,
XN
j= 1
aij= 1, 14 i4N
 B, emission matrix {bi(oj)} for the probabilities
from states si to observations oj,
XM
j= 1
bi(oj)= 1, 14 i4N
Example 1 (HMM example). An HMM used to simulate a
system’s health states and behaviors is illustrated by
Figure 2. It defines two states (respectively Healthy and
Faulty), and two observations representing that the output
values respect (R) or violate (V) the functional constraints.
The 3 matrices p, A and B are respectively: 0:6 0:4½ ,
0:7 0:3
0:4 0:6
 
and
0:9 0:1
0:2 0:8
 
.
As shown in Figure 3, HMM, as an abstract model of a
system, is statistically identical to the system’s real beha-
vior. The parameters in p, A and B can be obtained
through a training process using the observation data and
the Baum–Welch algorithm. Once all of these parameters
are estimated, an HMM is able to compute, given an
observation sequence, the maximum likelihood estimation
of inner-state transition sequences using the Viterbi algo-
rithm.14 Thus, it can be used to estimate the system’s cur-
rent (past) state, predict the system’s future state and
compute the occurrence probability of a future observation
sequence.
3. Related works
In Clarke and Zuliani,15 the authors aimed to prove the
validation of CPS’s behavioral properties by statistical
models. Our main ideas are quite similar: using statistical
model to deduce the probability of verification results.
They introduced a formal description in BLTL (bounded
linear temporal logic) to interpret the probable result
sequence, which is the same concept as the observation
sequence in HMM. This work relied on the importance-
sampling and cross-entropy (two classic statistical
methods). It needed much more samples to give out a con-
vincing conclusion. The reason behind is that BLTL treats
each element in a result sequence in a pure statistical thus
relatively independent manner, while the HMM modeling
method ensures that the system components are dependent
and thus the fault propagation is statistically preserved.
Some existing works16–19 proposed HMM-based algo-
rithms to diagnose or prognose system faults, where rich
training data is required to estimate the parameters in
HMMs. It is not applicable to the accidental faults due to
its non-frequent characteristics. Smyth18 and Ying et al.19
aimed at fault detection and diagnosis based on HMMs
under the single fault assumption.Figure 2. A two-state HMM.
Figure 3. HMM training approach
Smyth18 proposed to model the monitored system by
linear difference equations, where the parameters were
estimated in a training manner using the input and the
observed output data of the system. They relied on the
feedforward multi-layer neural network20 and a simple
maximum-likelihood Gaussian classifier21 to produce the
instantaneous estimates of the state probabilities, given the
observations. Hence, fault detection occurred by observing
changes in the values of estimated parameters. Finally, an
HMM model, which combined the past state estimates and
the current instantaneous estimates, was applied to deter-
mine the current state. The experimental results showed
that the neural-Markov combination was significantly bet-
ter than the combination of Gaussian–Markov in terms of
elimination of false alarms. However, it is difficult to build
a neural network for a large class of faults, while for the
accidental fault diagnosis, the classes of fault must include
all of the possibilities. This method is based on an impor-
tant assumption of availability of labeled training data,
which rules out applications where it is not possible to
gather such data like the accidental faults.
Ying et al.19 presented an HMM-based algorithm for
fault diagnosis in systems with partial and imperfect tests.
The initial state probabilities and state transition probabil-
ities were defined using the failure rates of components.
They constructed a fault dictionary via reachability analy-
sis on directed graph models by denoting that a failure
source was detected by a test or not. The emission prob-
abilities were defined using this fault dictionary and the
false alarm probabilities derived from tests using the cen-
tral limit theorem.22 All of these parameters were then
adapted by the Baum–Welch algorithm. Once the para-
meters are estimated, the trained HMM is used to deter-
mine the current state by employing a sliding window
Viterbi algorithm.
In our work, the modeling method for the states, initial
and transition matrices is quite similar to the work of
Yang et al.19 The main difference consists of the observa-
tions and the parameter estimation for the emission matrix,
which is the key problem for the HMM-based algorithms.
As the faulty output caused by an accidental fault may not
be continuous, it is possible for the system to behave nor-
mal after a sudden failure. Due to the non-frequent charac-
teristics of accidental faults, its diagnosis in complex
systems is restricted by the limited amount of faulty data.
When the failure rates of hardware components are avail-
able, it is not reasonable to rely on the limited amount of
faulty data to adapt the parameters in the initial and transi-
tion matrices using the Baum–Welch algorithm. We thus
propose to fix these two matrices using the failure rate
parameters of hardware components while estimate the
emission probabilities. The estimation method is based on
the principles of FTA and the maximum entropy in
Bayesian probability theory. A fault propagation distribu-
tion is thus computed, whose parameters are adapted using
the backward algorithm and observations. The parameter-
ized HMMs are then used to online diagnose accidental
faults using a vote algorithm integrated with a low-pass
filter.
The method for diagnosing accidental faults using
HMMs was first presented in our previous work.23
Compared with our previous work,23 this work has two
important improvements: introducing a low-pass filter to
the vote algorithm; and introducing a backward algorithm
that adapts the emission matrix parameters to the state
sequences derived from the observations. The experiments
show that the fault diagnosis has been prominently
improved.
4. Problem description
The accidental faults may occur on the hardware during
system’s execution. As their occurrence is infrequent, it is
rather rare to have two or more hardware components
being the source of accidental faults at exactly the same
time. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the following
single-fault assumption to the target problem.
Assumption 1 (Single-fault assumption). An occur-
rence of accidental fault denotes that at each time instant,
only one hardware component is the fault source. Two
components cannot be the source of accidental fault at the
same time.
The prior knowledge in this work consists of the failure
rate parameters of hardware components and system speci-
fications. The failure rate parameters are usually provided
by the hardware manufacture according to the testing
results before the hardware are supplied. They denote the
fault occurrence probability either caused by design faults,
physical wear and tear, environmental conditions or by a
peculiar set of inputs/excitations given to the system.
System specifications describe the expected functional
constraints. They are used to online test the pass/fail of the
output data of hardware components to build the observa-
tion sequences. The target problem is explained using the
following example.
Example 2 (Problem description example). During a
finite execution time t, six time instants are observed for
the system in Figure 4. Assume 5 functional constraints Cfi
(1 4 i 4 5) are available in the system specification.
After time t, the test results are obtained: R for respecting
specification, VI for single variable violating specifica-
tion, and VC for multiple variables violating functional
constraint. The test results are shown in Table 1.
When a wrong output from a component is observed,
usually the outputs from other components may also be
wrong due to the failure propagation. It is important to
distinguish the output fault of a component and the source
of fault. When a component is the fault source, many other
components may behave wrongly (output is wrong). The
modeling method thus should consider the dependencies
between the hardware elements and the fault propagation
between them.
The accidental fault diagnosis approach should allow
online analysis, which implies that the method needs to be
computation-economic and easy to be implemented by
most onboard embedded systems.
5. Online diagnosis of accidental fault
5.1. Overview of proposed approach
The modeling of HMM follows two steps: first, determine
the structure of HMM, i.e. the states and observations;
then, estimate the parameters for the three matrices.
An overview of the proposed approach is illustrated by
Figure 5. For a monitored system that contains n compo-
nents, n + 1 hidden states are modeled. Each state repre-
sents, at time t, which component has encountered an
accidental fault. The observation sequences are derived
from the test results with respect to the functional con-
straints. The parameters in the initial state distribution and
the state transition matrix are computed using the failure
rates of hardware components. The emission matrix para-
meters are estimated using a failure propagation algorithm
based on the principles of FTA and the maximum entropy
in Bayesian probability theory. Relying on the Viterbi
algorithm, the state sequences are derived from the obser-
vation sequences. They are then used to diagnose the acci-
dental faults using a vote algorithm through a low-pass
filter and to revise the parameters in the emission matrix
through a backward algorithm.
Compared with our previous work,23 this work intro-
duces the vote algorithm through the low-pass filter and
the backward algorithm for revising the failure propaga-
tion distribution to improve the diagnosis results.
5.2. System states
System states represent that at time t, which component is
the source of accidental fault. A system with n hardware
components is thus model by n + 1 states {si} (0 4 i
4 n). Here s0 represents that none of components
encounters accidental faults. Here si represents that the ith
component is the fault source.
5.3. Observations
Definition 1 (Physical variable). A component C has nI
inputs and nO outputs variables, which connect C with
other components. These variables are defined as physical
variables of C.
During the execution of a monitored system, the test
results of functional constraints are available. The observa-
tions represent that physical variables respect or violate
the functional constraints. If m physical variables vj (1 4
j 4 m) are involved, m HMMs {hj} are modeled for this
system. Here hj describes how a variable vj behaves in
terms of functional constraints during system’s execution.
Figure 4. Problem description example.
Table 1. Output observations.
t Cf1(v1,v2,v3) Cf2(v7,v11) Cf3(v9) Cf4(v4,v5,v6) Cf5(v2)
1 R R R R R
2 R R R R R
3 VC R R VC R
4 R R R R VI
5 VC R R VC VI
It is possible to generate three kinds of observations for vj:
respecting, independent violating or coupling violating
functional constraints.
Definition 2 (Respecting (R)). When a physical variable
does not violate any functional constraint, this observation
is defined as Respecting.
Definition 3 (Independent violation (VI)). When a physical
variable v violates a functional constraint that only con-
tains v, i.e. C(v), this observation is defined as independent
violation.
Definition 4 (Coupling Violation (VC)). When v violates a
functional constraint containing v as well as other vari-
ables, i.e. C(v, v1, v2, .), this observation is defined as
coupling violation.
Therefore, each HMM hj has these three kinds of obser-
vations: R, VI and VC. The structure of HMMs that model
the monitored system is thus defined, as shown in
Figure 6.
An intuitive way for modeling the observations is to
directly use two observed statuses: respected (R) and vio-
lated (V). In this work, we provide more details in the
observation by distinguishing VI and VC. The observations
will be used to decide the probabilities in the emission
matrix, which depends on the topology structure connect-
ing by physical variables. We rely on the principles of
FTA to compute the influence weight of variables, which
requires as much as detailed test results about each
variable.
5.4. Initial probability distribution p
For a system with n components, the failure rate para-
meters {vi} (1 4 i 4 n) of hardware components {Ci}
are usually provided by its manufacture or determined by
the MTBF (mean time between failure). Without prior
knowledge, {vi} are determined by
Pn
i, j= 1 vi ÿ vj
 = 0.
According to the definition of HMM, p = {pi} are directly
computed as follows:
p0=
Qn
i= 1
(1ÿ vi)
Qn
i= 1
(1ÿ vi)+
Pn
i= 1
vi
ð1Þ
pi=
viQn
i= 1
(1ÿ vi)+
Pn
i= 1
vi
, 14 i4 n ð2Þ
Figure 5. Approach overview.
5.5. Transition probability matrix A
Here {aij} (0 4 i, j 4 n) represents the probabilities of
the transition from state i to state j. It is computed using
the failure rate parameters {vi}. When the system transits
from current state to the no fault state s0, the transition
probability is
Qn
k= 1 (1ÿ vk). When the system transits to
a faulty component state sj (j6¼0), the probability is
vj 
Qn
k= 1, k 6¼j (1ÿ vk). After normalization, A is deter-
mined as follows:
ai0=
Qn
k= 1
(1ÿ vk)
Qn
k= 1
(1ÿ vk)+
Pn
n= 1
(vn
QN
k= 1, k 6¼j
(1ÿ vk))
,
04 i4 n
ð3Þ
aij=
vj
Qn
k= 1, k 6¼j
(1ÿ vk)
Qn
k= 1
(1ÿ vk)+
Pn
p= 1
(vp
Qn
k= 1, k 6¼j
(1ÿ vk))
,
04 i4 n, 14 j4 n
ð4Þ
5.6. Emission probability matrix B
Here {bij(O)} (0 4 i 4 n, 1 4 j 4 m, O 2 {R, VI,
VC}) represents, if a component encounters accidental
faults, the probability that it will influence the observa-
tions. More precisely, how probably the physical variables
will violate the functional constraints. Inspired by the prin-
ciples of FTA and the principle of maximum entropy in
Bayesian probability theory, we propose the algorithms
for computing B, as shown in Figure 7.
5.6.1. Computing influence graph GI.
Definition 5 (Dependency graph GD). A dependency
graph represents the dependency between system’s compo-
nents. It is directly derived from the system’s topology
structure.
Definition 6 (Influence graph GI). An influence graph is a
graph representing how components’ accidental fault
influences its output physical variables. Influence graph is
topologically identical to the dependency graph, with sup-
plementary influence weights indicating the probability
that the component Ci influences its output variables {vj}.
An influence layout algorithm is proposed to compute the
influence weights GI(i, j).
Example 3 (Influence graph example). Figure 8 is an
influence graph with 9 components and 15 physical vari-
ables. Based on the dependency graph, the influence
weights GI(1, 2) and GI(2, 3) respectively indicate whether
component C1 (respectively C2) is the fault source, the
probability that v2 (respectively v3) will be influenced to
produce a wrong output.
Algorithm 1 (Influence layout algorithm). An influence
graph with n components and m variables can be solved
by applying linear programming to Equations (5)–(8).
Figure 6. HMMs for m observation variables.
Figure 7. Emission matrix algorithms.
Equation (5) normalizes all of the influence weights:
Xm
i= 1
vi= 1 ð5Þ
Equation (6) ensures that a component must have some
impact on its output variables:
vi. 0 ð6Þ
Equation (7) represents the failure effect caused by a com-
ponent C (denoted as e(t)), which is equal to the difference
between the sum of C’s output weights and the sum of its
input weights:
X
in
vi ÿ
X
out
vj= e(t) ð7Þ
Here e(t) varies along with the execution time t, and is
measured using the state sequences and the backward
algorithm (Algorithm 6, explained later in Section 5.9).
The maximum entropy principle states that the prob-
ability distribution which best represents the current state
of knowledge is the one with largest entropy. Equation
(8)ensures that the difference between variables must be
minimized according to this principle:
min
v1...vm
Xm
i= 1
vi ÿ
1
m
Xm
j= 1
vj

 ð8Þ
5.6.2. Computing influence distribution DI. The influence
graph gives out the influence weight from a component to
its direct output variables. This faulty impact will propa-
gate through the dependency structure of the system. The
propagated weights are recorded in the influence
distribution.
Definition 7 (Influence distribution DI). When component
Ci is the fault source, the failure influence it causes to all
of the physical variables {vj} is defined as DI (i, j).
Ideally, DI can be derived from exhaustive simulation
or tests. If enough simulation or test scenarios that cover
all of the variable ranges are available, the parameters in
DI can be almost the same as the real values. The problem
is that, for the non-frequent accidental fault, the time for
obtaining enough training data by exhaustive simulation
(test) is not definitive. To make a compromise between the
computation time and the parameter precision, we compute
DI using the influence graph. The algorithm is based on
the principle of FTA, a top-down deductive failure analysis
method widely used in the FDI techniques, in which an
undesirable state of a system is analyzed using Boolean
logic to combine a series of lower-level events. It is an
heuristic algorithm, in which the coefficients will be pre-
cise with respect to the problem. In this work, we propose
the following influence distribution algorithm to compute
the coefficients of fault propagation.
Algorithm 2 (Influence distribution algorithm). When the
output variables of component Ci violates some functional
constraints, it is either because Ci has encountered an
accidental fault, or because one of its dependent compo-
nents Cj has encountered an accidental fault and thus Ci is
influenced due to the failure propagation.
 If Ci has encountered an accidental fault, it will
probably generate an output violation. The reason
why it is not a definitive violation is that the cou-
pling variables referred to by the functional con-
straints may also be influenced. This probability is
defined as DA.
 If Ci depends on Cj (Ci directly or indirectly takes
Cj’s output as input), and an accidental fault occurs
on Cj, Ci will probably have an output violation. It
is not a definitive violation, because either the cou-
pling variables referred to by the functional con-
straints may also be influenced; or the intermediate
component’s design has fault-tolerance consider-
ation. This probability is defined as DB.
As DA and DB are independent. If vj directly depends on ci,
at the same time, it can indirectly depend on ci due to the
control feedback loop. Therefore, we have
DI (i, j)=DA(i, j)+DB(i, j) ð9Þ
 If variable vj does not depend on component Ci (Ci
has no path to vj),
DI (i, j)= 0 ð10Þ
Figure 8. Influence graph example.
 If vj directly depends on Ci,
DA(i, j)=GI (i, j) ð11Þ
 If vj indirectly depends on Ci, let {vk} (k6¼j) be the
output variables of Ci, and Ck be the target compo-
nent of vk. The DB(i, j) can be recursively computed
as follows:
DB(i, j)=
X
k
GI (i, k)I (k, j) ð12Þ
Example 4 (Influence distribution algorithm example). An
example of influence distribution algorithm is given by
Figure 9. We enumerate three cases.
1. DI(1, 11): As there is no path from C1 to v11, v11 is
independent from C1. The influence weight from C1
to v11 is DI(1,11) = 0.
2. DI(1, 1): As v1 is the direct output from C1 and
there is no control feedback loop, the influence
weight from C1 to v1 is DI(1,1) = DA(1,1) =
GI(1,1).
3. DI(1,3): As v3 indirectly depends on C1, the influ-
ence weight from C1 to v3(DI(1,3)) is computed
using Equation (12), as follows:
DI (1, 3)=GI (1, 1)  DI (2, 3)+GI (1, 2)
 DI (3, 3)=GI (1, 1)  DA(2, 3)
+ 0=GI (1, 1)  GI (2, 3)
5.6.3. Emission probability matrix B. Algorithm 3 (Emission
matrix algorithm). For the HMM hj of variable vj, we use
the following algorithm to compute the probability for the
observations R, VI and VC from state si.
 For the independent violation VI, its probability is
directly deduced from DI.
bij(VI )=DI (i, j) ð13Þ
 For the coupling violation VC, if vj violates func-
tional constrains containing other variables {vk}
(k6¼j), assume vk appears nk times in all of the func-
tional constraints, and vj appears nj times, the cou-
pling violation probability is computed as follows:
bij(VC)=
nj  DI (i, j)P
k nk  DI (i, k)
ð14Þ
 For the non-violation observation R, its probability
is
bij(R)= 1ÿ bij(VI )ÿ bij(VC) ð15Þ
Obviously, the healthy state (s0) will lead to b0j(R) = 1,
b0j(VI) = 0 and b0j(VC) = 0.
5.7. Viterbi algorithm
Once the parameters in HMMs are estimated, it can be
used to decode an observation sequence O= fotg into the
most likely state sequence Q= fqtg. This is computed
using the Viterbi algorithm, a dynamic programming algo-
rithm for finding the most likely sequence of hidden states
(called a Viterbi path).
Suppose that T time instants are observed for a system
with m physical variables and n components. Therefore, m
HMMs with n + 1 states are modeled, denoted as hj,
1 4 j 4 m. For each {hj}, an observation sequence of
length T is thus obtained.
To find the single optimal state sequence, the Viterbi
algorithm defines a variable d(i) in
dt(i)= max
q1q2...qtÿ1
Pfq1q2 . . . qt = si, o1o2 . . . otjhjg ð16Þ
which represents the maximum probability along a single
path that accounts for the first t observations and ends at
state si.
By induction, dt+ 1(k) can be computed as
dt+ 1(k)= max
i
½dt(i)aik bk(ot+ 1) ð17Þ
To retrieve the state sequence, we need to keep the track
of the state that maximizes dt(i) at each time t, which is
done by constructing the following array, where ut+ 1(k)
is the state at time t from which a transition to state sj max-
imizes the probability dt+ 1(k)
ut+ 1(k)= argmax
14 i4 n+ 1
½dt(i)aik  ð18Þ
Figure 9. Influence distribution example.
The Viterbi algorithm for finding the optimal state
sequence becomes as follows.
 Initialization:
d1(i)=pibi(o1), 14 i4N ð19Þ
u1(i)= 0(no previous states) ð20Þ
 Recursion:
dt(j)= max
14 i4 n+ 1
½dtÿ1(i)aik bk(ot), 24 t4 T , 14 k4 n+ 1
ð21Þ
ut(k)= argmax
14 k4 n+ 1
½dtÿ1(i)aik , 24 t4 T , 14 k4 n+ 1
ð22Þ
 Termination:
P= max
14 i4 n+ 1
½dT (i) ð23Þ
qT = argmax
14 i4 n+ 1
½dT (i) ð24Þ
 The optimal state sequence can be retrieved by
backtracking
qt =ut+ 1(qt+ 1), t= T ÿ 1, T ÿ 2, . . . , 1 ð25Þ
The computation complexity of Viterbi algorithm is
O(K2L), where K and L are respectively the number of
HMM states and the length of O. To online diagnose acci-
dental faults for time t, we use the observation sequences
in the past time of t according to the feature of Markov
process. When t is too long, we might have huge quantity
of observation sequences, which makes the computation
time increases, a sampling window of w is thus introduced
to ensure the efficiency of the online diagnosis.
5.8. Vote algorithm
At time t, each HMM hj obtains an optimal state sequence
Q= fqtg using the Viterbi algorithm. As the system is
modeled by m HMMs, a state sequence matrix of size m
by t is built using the m optimal state sequences, denoted
as Qj= fqt(j)g. Here Qj is used to diagnose accidental
faults using a vote algorithm and also provide feedback by
a backward algorithm to revise the emission matrix
parameters.
Algorithm 4 (Vote algorithm). For time t, each HMM
computes the most probable fault source respectively using
its state sequence Q= fqtg, and vote to synthesize a glob-
ally optimized result. In order to avoid hash synthesis, it
would be a good idea to wait for several periods to see if
the vote is stable. More precisely, to diagnose the potential
fault source at time t, it needs to observe from instant t 2
w to t to see whether the trend is stable, where w is the time
window. This can be considered as a low-pass filter for the
vote result. The larger this time window is, the fewer false
alarms will be given by the method. In practice, this value
decides the trade-off between the timeliness of online anal-
ysis and cost of false alarm handling. Therefore, a new
state sequence bQ= fq^tg is derived thought the low-pass
filter (given by Algorithm 5).
At time T, the optimal state sequence matrix after using
the low-pass filter is bQj= fq^t(j)g, 1 4 j 4 m and
T 2 w + 1 4 t 4 T.
The global vote results are represented by a vote matrix
V= fvt(i)g, 0 4 i 4 n. It computes, at time t, the
appearance times of the state si among the m state
sequences.
vt(i)=
Xm
j= 1
u(bqt (j)) ð26Þ
Algorithm 5. (Low-pass filter algorithm).
public static int[] filter(int[] original, int delayWindow,
int HEALTH_INDEX) {
int[] newSeq = new int[original.length];
for (int i = 0; i < delayWindow; i++ )
newSeq [i] = original[i];
for (int i = delayWindow; i < original.length; i++ ) {
int v = original[i];
int endIndex = -1;
boolean match = true;
for (int j = i; j > i - delayWindow; j–) {
if (original[j] != HEALTH_INDEX
&& original[j] != v) {
match = false;
break;
}
if (original[j] == v)
endIndex = j;
}
if (!match)
newSeq[i] = original[i];
else {
if (endIndex == -1)
newSeq[i] = original[i];
else {
// smooth
for (int j = endIndex; j <= i; j++ )
newSeq[j] = v;
}
}
}
return newSeq;
}
u(q^t(j))=
1 bqt (j)= si
0 bqt (j) 6¼ si

ð27Þ
In order to observe the trends of fault occurrence along
with the time, we introduce a variation matrix to measure
the fault trends between two neighboring time instants.
This matrix is denoted as U= fut(i)g:
ut(i)=
0 t= T ÿ w+ 1
vt(i)ÿ vtÿ1(i) T ÿ w4 t4 T

ð28Þ
The accidental fault log F = fftg is then derived from
the matrices U and V:
ft =
fsijmax ut(i)g card(ft)= 1
fsijsi 2 max ut(i) ^max vt(i)g card(ft)5 2

ð29Þ
Example 5 (Vote algorithm example). For a time dura-
tion 5, the state sequences for 3 variables derived from the
Viterbi algorithm are shown in Table 2. The system has 3
components, and the time window is 5 time units. The state
sequence matrix after low-pass filtering is Table 3. The
vote matrix derived from state sequence matrix is given by
Table 4, and the variation matrix is given by Table 5. By
applying the vote algorithm, the accidental fault log F is
shown in Table 6.
5.9. Backward algorithm
This backward algorithm adapts the emission matrix para-
meters to the state sequences derived from the observa-
tions. It is used to revise the parameter e(t) in Equation (7)
when computing the influence distribution. The e(t) repre-
sents the fault impact that a component causes to its output
variables.
Algorithm 6 (Backward algorithm). At the initial time,
none of components is faulty, thus the fault impact of the
component Ci is 0. If t 5 1, the value of ei(t) is computed
using the vote matrix V obtained from the state sequence
matrix Q:
ei(t)=
P
t
vt(i)
(n+ 1)t 14 t\wPt
tÿw+ 1
vt(i)
(n+ 1)w t5w
8>><
>>:
ð30Þ
6. Experimental results
It is difficult to evaluate a fault diagnosis method for acci-
dental faults, because it is too costly to monitor accidental
fault data from real systems. We thus design a specific test
bed to randomly generate a large amount of test cases to
assess some measures for fault diagnosis approaches: the
sensitivity, specificity precision, accuracy and F1-score.
6.1. Experiment measures
To give the experiment measures for our fault diagnosis
approach, the contingency matrix is given in Table 7. The
system is either healthy (s0) or faulty (si, i6¼ 0). The diagno-
sis state derived from the HMM approach is either healthy
(s0) or faulty as same as the system state (si), or faulty but
different from the system state (sj, j6¼i). Therefore, the test
results can be hit faulty state, hit healthy state, false alarm,
error alarm, or miss healthy state.
Table 2. State sequence matrix.
t 1 2 3 4 5
Q1 s0 s2 s1 s1 s1
Q2 s0 s1 s0 s0 s1
Q3 s0 s1 s3 s2 s2
Table 3. Filtered state sequence matrix.
t 1 2 3 4 5
Q1 s0 s2 s1 s1 s1
Q2 s0 s1 s1 s1 s1
Q3 s0 s1 s3 s2 s2
Table 4. Vote matrix.
t 1 2 3 4 5
s0 3 0 0 0 0
s1 0 2 2 2 2
s2 0 1 0 1 1
s3 0 0 1 0 0
Table 5. Variation matrix.
t 1 2 3 4 5
s0 0 − 3 0 0 0
s1 0 2 0 0 0
s2 0 1 − 1 1 0
s3 0 0 1 − 1 0
Table 6. Accidental fault log.
t 1 2 3 4 5
F s0 s1 s3 s2 s1
In pattern recognition and information retrieval with
binary classification, the following measures are usually
used to assess the performance of the statistical
approaches.24
 Sensitivity (recall rate) relates to the ability to iden-
tify an accidental fault correctly:
Sensitivity=
P
hiP
hi+
P
e+
P
m
ð31Þ
The miss rate can be derived from it:
Miss rate= 1ÿ sensitivity ð32Þ
 Specificity relates to the ability to exclude an acci-
dental fault correctly:
Specificity=
P
h0P
h0+
P
f
ð33Þ
 Precision relates to the ability to avoid the false
alarm:
Precision=
P
hiP
hi+
P
e+
P
f
ð34Þ
The false alarm rate can be derived from it:
False alarm rate= 1ÿ precision ð35Þ
 Accuracy (hit rate) relates to the ability to diagnose
system’s state correctly:
Accuracy=
P
hi+
P
h0P
hi +
P
h0+
P
e+
P
m+
P
f
ð36Þ
 F1-score is a measure of a statistic test’s accuracy.
F1ÿ score= 23
precision3 recall
precision+ recall
ð37Þ
6.2. Test bed
The pattern of system instance generated by the test bed
follows the classical definition: a system has several
components; components are connected by physical vari-
ables. A variable can be read by multiple components, but
can only be written by one component. System itself has
input and output, which is an encapsulation of some com-
ponent’s input/output variable according to system
architecture.
Component, when encountering an accidental fault, will
output, in a high probability p1 (0.95), some non-func-
tional-compliant data. A normal component, when dealing
with a faulty input, tends to output also an faulty output in
probability p2 (0.6). Since component may have inner
states, this negative impact may last for some time (less
than p3 (10 time units)), with a probability p4 (0.5). Due to
the incompleteness of functional constraints, an actual
fault will only be identifiable in a probability p5 (0.8) by
applying these checks.
The five parameters above p1 2 p5 vary from system
to system. Some of them cannot even be easily represented
by probability, for example, a good fault tolerance design
will make p2 and p4 very specific to compute. In this arti-
cle, in order to maximize the generality, all these para-
meters are excluded for the system configuration diversity.
They are defined by constants. These constants are intent
to cover as large as possible the real system pattern space.
A random test configuration is composed of the follow-
ing parameters.
 Component number: defines the total number of
component in this system instance.
 Min/Max component failure rate: each component
will be distributed a failure rate falling into this
range. Higher the rate, more likely to encounter an
accidental fault.
 Min/Max component output/input variable number:
each component will have a number of input/output
variables, and their quantity is limited by the range
respectively.
 Min/Max accidental fault number: during a simula-
tion, defines how many accidental faults will be
generated.
 Simulation time: defines the observation time for
each system simulation.
 Time window: defines the sampling window for
observations.
Table 7. Contingency matrix.
System state
Faulty si Healthy s0
HMM state Faulty si Hit faulty state si (hi) False alarm (f)
Faulty sj Error (e)
Healthy s0 Miss healthy state (m) Hit healthy state (h0)
6.3. Experimental results
We assess the performance of the proposed approach
through the measures including sensitivity (recall rate),
specificity, precision, accuracy and F1-score. We have
generated more than 1.4 3 105 test cases by varying the
parameters in Table 7. The objective is to analyze the var-
iation trends of there measures along with the system’s
scale, the sparsity of accidental faults and the sampling
window size. In addition, as a low-pass filter algorithm is
introduced to compute the optimal state sequence, we
respectively analyze the measure values for the methods
without and with low-pass filter to assess the effectiveness
of the low-pass filter algorithm.
6.3.1. Experimental results by average component
number. Figure 10 gives the average measure values vary-
ing with the average component number for both methods.
The following conclusions are derived from the test results.
 The specificity and accuracy are nearly 100% in
both methods. This phenomenon is quite obvious.
For the non-frequent accidental faults, its occur-
rence times (limited from 1 to 26 in our experi-
ments) during the simulation (from 1000 to 2000
time units) is far less the number of normal states
in the system. This explains why the average values
Table 8. Parameters in test cases.
Parameter Value
Component number 10–90
Failure rate of hardware component 5 × 10− 4–7 × 10− 4
Output variable number
per component
2–5
Accidental fault number 1–26
Simulation time units 1000–2000
Sampling window size 3–30
Figure 10. Measures with average component number from 10 to 90.
of specificity and accuracy are almost 100% in all
of the following test results.
 The measures are largely improved by the low-pass
filter.
 The method is robust with respect to the number of
components (the scale of system).
6.3.2. Experimental results by average output variable
number. Figure 11 in page 19 gives the average measure
values varying with the average number of output vari-
ables per component for both methods. The following con-
clusions are derived from the test results.
 The measures are largely improved by the low-pass
filter.
 The method is robust with respect to the average
number of variables per component (the scale of
system).
6.3.3. Experimental results by average accidental fault
number. Figure 12 in page 20 gives the average measure
values varying with the average accidental fault number
during the simulation. The following conclusions are
derived from these test.
 The measures are largely improved by the low-pass
filter.
 The method is robust with respect to the number of
accidental faults (the sparsity of data).
Figure 11. Measures with average output variable number per component from 1.5 to 4.
6.3.4. Experimental results by the size of sampling
window. Figure 13 gives the average measure values vary-
ing with the size of the sampling window. When the time
window is larger than 3 time units, the measures become
stable and are not effectively impacted by the size of time
window. This ensures the efficiency of online analysis.
6.4. Discussion: multiple fault diagnosis
Our base hypothesis in this work is that at any moment, at
most only one component can be the source of accidental
failure (which indeed implies that the old fault will disap-
pear when a new one occurs). It is true that when there is
only one fault source in a system, many hardware compo-
nents may behave wrongly. As the Assumption 1 defined
the states in the HMM that represent the component of
fault source. In other words, a component that is not the
fault source may be faulty (the outputs violate the func-
tional constraints) due to the fault propagation. The
modeling method thus has considered the dependencies
between the hardware elements and the fault propagation
between them.
We fully understand that at first glance, the single fault
source assumption makes the approach not applicable for
real-world scenarios because all can go wrong at any
moment. However, it should be known that this simplifica-
tion is only a trade-off for online fault analysis perfor-
mance: our method can deal with the case that ‘‘at any
moment t, at most K components of failure source can
simultaneously occur (K 5 1)’’. Therefore, 2K states will
be modeled in one HMM. The only issue is that, for an
HMM with 2K states, the analysis time will be quite long,
which could degrade the timeliness of online fault
analysis.
To be more precise, in our original work, we do handle
the problem in a general way: inner states are the combina-
tion of the fault source component, the emission matrices
are the overlap (normalized accumulation) of related
Figure 12. Measures with average accidental fault number from 1 to 26.
states’ influence distribution, etc. The test result is also
quite positive (average measures are also . 90%). The
problem we encountered is that from K . 4, for a system
having more than 30 components, the analyzing time (on a
PC laptop) will exceed the cycle period of a typical
embedded system (e.g. 50 ms), which compromises
‘‘online analysis’’. Therefore, we found that this method,
although it had high accuracy, required a computing trade-
off for large-scale systems. That is why finally we decide
to remove the generosity to keep the maximum scalability.
Today we found that if K = 1, the analysis can be done in
time (\ 50 ms) for a system having less than 700 compo-
nents, which covers largely the real industrial scenarios.
That is also why we have developed another method25
(each component is an HMM, compared with this method
where each observed variable is an HMM). The bench-
mark shows that the component-based method is less accu-
rate (4–11% decrease), but can be computed very fast, so
is more scalable for industrial usage.
A question may be raised: why no parallel computation?
If we introduce parallel computation, will it solve the per-
formance problem that we can re-enable the generosity of
the approach? Effectively, each HMM can be computed
independently once their parameter has been defined. But
this can only be done on a PC. Because finally we need to
embed this online analysis function into an embedded parti-
tion, and current standard prevents the parallel computation
inside the same partition (even between partitions it is not
recommended). Therefore we have to ignore this option.
6.5. Discussion: modeling method of multiple
HMMs
In our work, the Viterbi algorithm from Section 5.7 is
applied for each observation variable independently for the
related HMM and then these results are combined using
voting. It seems that a single HMM where all observations
are combined would be better as this would allow us to
use the combined observation to detect the right faulty
component and not only trust some majority of observa-
tions. It is very possible that a majority of the observed
variables are not reflecting a particular fault and, therefore,
it is impossible to conclude where the failure source is on
their own. We will discuss this problem in the following
two parts.
First, why multiple HMMs instead of one HMM? This
concern is fully understandable and in fact it was indeed
our modeling choice in our earlier experiments. The prob-
lem is related to HMM’s characteristics: the smaller the
difference between the values of different matrix elements
is, the worse its prediction would be (entropy is smaller).
It is more likely to happen if observation number increases
(e.g. if we take 0.1 as granularity, for a HMM having 1
inner state, if it contains 2 observation states, it only has 1/
11 chance ([0.5, 0.5] among the following 11 possible
emission matrices [0, 1], [0.1, 0.9], ., [0.9, 0.1], [1, 0]))
that these observations cannot distinguish from each other
from the view point of information. But if it contains 3
observation states, it can have a chance of 18/66
([0.1,0.1,0.8], [0.3,0.3,0.4], etc.)
So, when combining all observations into a single
HMM, the whole HMM’s parameter (particularly for
emission matrix, because initial and transition matrices are
the same for all variables) is ‘‘flattened’’. The difference
between elements of emission matrix is decreased. This
leads to a non-accurate fault isolation result (around 70%
according to our tests). So the choice of multiple HMMs
has improved this single HMM modeling.
Second, will a partial vote mislead the result? The
answer is first a yes. Let us consider a extreme case: there
Figure 13. Measures with sample window size from 3 to 30.
is only one observation variable available (so only one
HMM will do the vote), and the faulty component will not
influence this variable at all (i.e. not direct/indirect data-
flow towards this variable), the conclusion given by this
HMM will make no sense. The final answer is that we can
avoid this. All variables are not necessarily to be con-
trolled, but at least we need to guarantee that if we take a
backward dependency analysis, all components must be
covered at least once by the controlled variable set.
7. Conclusion
This article presents an HMM-based approach to online
diagnose accidental faults for real-time embedded systems.
By introducing reasonable and appropriate abstraction of
complex systems, HMM is used to describe the healthy or
faulty states of a system’s hardware components. The
observation sequences are derived from the test results
with respect to the functional constraints defined in system
specifications. They are parametrized to statistically simu-
late the real system’s behavior. As it is not easy to obtain
rich accidental fault data from a real system, the Baum–
Welch algorithm cannot be employed here to train the
parameters in HMMs. The parameters in the initial state
distribution and the state transition matrix are computed
using the failure rates of hardware components. The para-
meters in the emission matrix are estimated using the fail-
ure propagation algorithm. The estimation method is based
on the principles of FTA and the maximum entropy in
Bayesian probability theory. A fault propagation distribu-
tion is thus computed, whose parameters are adapted using
the backward algorithm and observations. The parameter-
ized HMMs are then used to online diagnose accidental
faults using a vote algorithm integrated with a low-pass fil-
ter. We have designed a specific test bed to analyze the
measures including the sensitivity, specificity, precision,
accuracy and F1-score by generating a large amount of test
cases. The test results show that the proposed approach is
robust, efficient and accurate.
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